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Abstract We consider the problem of pricing items in order to maximize the rev-
enue obtainable from a set of single minded customers. We relate the tractability
of the problem to structural properties of customers’ valuations: the problem admits
an efficient approximation algorithm, parameterized along the inhomogeneity of the
valuations.
Keywords Pricing problems · Computational complexity ·
Approximation algorithm
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem definition
Let I = {1, . . . , m} represent a set of items for sale and let J = {1, . . . , n} repre-
sent a set of potential customers. Every customer j ∈ J requests a subset of items,
denoted I j ⊆ I . We refer to these subsets as bundles. Customers are single minded,
which refers to the fact that they are interested in their particular bundle only. The
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valuation v j for each bundle I j , j ∈ J , is publicly known. This is reasonable when
assuming customers’ rationality and a competitive market environment: any customer
can observe the publicly known prices for her bundle at all companies in the market,
and then, behaving rationally, the customer defines her valuation being the cheapest
market price for her bundle. We assume v j > 0, j ∈ J , for otherwise the custom-
ers having non-positive valuations can be deleted from the instance. We assume the
items are available in unlimited supply, that is to say, we deal with digital goods or
services. Let pi be the price for item i ∈ I . We refer to the set W = W (p) ={
j ∈ J | ∑i∈I j pi ≤ v j
}
as the set of winners. The bundle pricing problem asks
for a vector of item prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) such that the total revenue (p) =∑
j∈W (p)
∑
i∈I j pi is maximal. Let us denote by  the maximal revenue that can be
extracted from the given set of customers.
1.2 Related work
The bundle pricing problem was introduced in combinatorial optimization literature by
Guruswami et al. (2005). They show that the problem is APX-hard. Later, Demaine et
al. (2008) prove that the problem is inapproximable by a semi-logarithmic factor in the
number of customers n. On the positive side, Guruswami et al. (2005) present a poly-
nomial time O(log n + log m)-approximation algorithm. Hartline and Koltun (2005)
design near-linear and near-cubic time approximation schemes under the assumption
that the number of distinct items m is constant. Under the monotonicity condition that
the total price of any bundle does not exceed the total price of any bigger bundle,
Grigoriev et al. (2008) show that the problem is still NP-hard but admits a polynomial
time approximation scheme.
1.3 Our result
In this note we interpret customers’ valuations in such a way that we come a step closer
towards understanding the complexity of the problem. To start with, let us make the
following definition.
Definition 1 For any instance of the bundle pricing problem, define b¯ j = v j/|I j | as
the average (per item) valuation of customer j . Let b¯min = min j∈J
{
b¯ j
}
and b¯max =
max j∈J
{
b¯ j
}
. Define the inhomogeneity of valuations as α = b¯max/b¯min.
Notice that α ≥ 1, and that the problem becomes trivial as soon as the valuations
are homogeneous (that is, α = 1 and b¯ j =: b¯ for all j). In this case, setting the price
for each item i ∈ I uniformly at pi = b¯, we obtain the optimal solution.
In contrast to the trivially solvable homogeneous case, the problem with inhomo-
geneity of valuations is NP-hard. While this does not sound very surprising, the main
point is that the NP-hardness holds even if the inhomogeneity α is bounded from above
by any constant 1 + ε. In some sense, we thereby delineate the borderline between
triviality and NP-hardness for the bundle pricing problem.
For the fact that the bundle pricing problem is NP-hard even for inhomogeneity
arbitrarily close to 1, consider the NP-hardness reduction from Independent Set to
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the bundle pricing problem presented in Grigoriev et al. (2008). In this reduction, all
average valuations of the bundles are at least M and at most M + 1, where M is a
chosen large number. The NP-hardness result for α ≤ 1+ε, ε > 0, follows straightfor-
wardly. Moreover, the reduction works even under stronger restrictions on customers’
valuations, namely monotonicity: v j ≤ vk for any j, k ∈ J such that I j ⊂ Ik . Thus,
we proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The bundle pricing problem is strongly NP-hard even if inhomogeneity
α ≤ 1 + ε for any ε > 0, and if the valuations are monotone.
In the next section we present a parametric approximation algorithm for the bundle
pricing problem that complements the NP-hardness result. The proposed O(nm)-time
algorithm has performance guarantee 1 + ln α + ε, for any ε > 0. Notice that this is
a constant-factor approximation algorithm as soon as the inhomogeneity α of valua-
tions is bounded by some constant, and the semi-logarithmic inapproximability result
of Demaine et al. (2008) is not longer valid. We believe that a constant bound on α is
not unreasonable in practical applications.
2 An O(ln α)-approximation algorithm
The idea of the approximation algorithm is as follows. We partition the set of custom-
ers J into O(ln α) subsets S1, . . . , SK , such that in each subset any two customers
have average valuations different from each other by at most a constant factor δ > 1.
Denote by k the maximum revenue for the bundle pricing problem restricted to the
set of customers Sk (referred to as Sk-restricted problem). Then
∑K
k=1 Πk is clearly
an upper bound for the optimum Π of the original problem. Therefore, the highest
maximum revenue maxk=1,...,K Πk over all restricted problems is at least Π/K . Next,
from the fact that the inhomogeneity of the average valuations in Sk is bounded by at
most factor of δ, we derive that for the Sk-restricted problem there exists a price vector
generating revenue at least Πk/δ. Thus, taking the price vector yielding the highest
revenue over all restricted problems, we generate a revenue at least Π/δK . Finally,
we optimize the performance guarantee over parameters K and δ.
To partition the set of customers J into subsets S1, . . . , SK , we use straightforward
geometric scaling of average valuations. Namely, we assign customer j ∈ J to subset
S1 if b¯ j ≤ δb¯min, and we assign her to subset Sk, k ≥ 2, if δk−1b¯min < b¯ j ≤ δk b¯min,
where δ > 1 is to be defined later.
By definition of the inhomogeneity α, we have b¯max = αb¯min. Let K be the larg-
est integer such that b¯max ≥ δK−1b¯min or equivalently α ≥ δK−1. Thus, K ≤ 1 +
logδ α = 1 + ln α/ ln δ, and we derived the first ingredient of the approximation
algorithm, formulated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For any δ > 1, the number of subsets K is at most 1 + ln α/ ln δ.
Second, we show that there is a solution to the Sk-restricted problem such that (i)
the set of winners W = Sk ; and (ii) the revenue generated in this solution is at least
Πk/δ. Consider the price vector pk = (pk1, . . . , pkm) where for all i ∈ I we have the
uniform price pki = min{b¯ j | j ∈ Sk}. Now, consider a customer j ∈ Sk . By definition
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of price vector pk , the price of bundle I j is
∑
i∈I j p
k
i ≤
∑
i∈I j b¯ j = v j , and therefore
j ∈ W . By definition of set Sk, max j∈Sk b¯ j/ min j∈Sk b¯ j ≤ δ, that yields a revenue at
least Πk/δ. Thus, we proved the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In the Sk-restricted problem, price vector pk yields a revenue at least Πk/δ.
Now, we are ready to present our first approximation result.
Theorem 2 The bundle pricing problem admits an e(2 + ln α)-approximation algo-
rithm with computation time O(nm).
Proof The combination of Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately implies that the revenue
generated by the best price vector from {pk | k = 1, . . . , K } is at least Π/δ(1 + ln αln δ ),
which is maximized for δ = e
(
1
2 +
√
1
4 + 1ln α
)−1
. Then, the approximation guarantee fol-
lows from the following two facts. Firstly, δ = e
(
1
2 +
√
1
4 + 1ln α
)−1
is monotone increas-
ing in α and approaches e when α tends to infinity. Secondly, for any α > 1, if
δ = e
(
1
2 +
√
1
4 + 1ln α
)−1
, it is not hard to see that ln αln δ ≤ 1 + ln α.
We arrive at the computation time as follows. Firstly, we conventionally omit the
dependance on the input length of the numbers v j , which are treated as constants.
Doing so, because K ≤ 2 + ln α ≤ 2 + ln max j∈J v j , also parameter K , the size
of the partition of customers, does not appear in the analysis. Hence, computing the
average valuations for all customers takes O(nm) time. Moreover, the assignment of
customers to subsets and finding the uniform price vectors can be done in O(n) time.
Computing the revenues also takes O(n) time. Therefore, the total computation time
is O(nm). unionsq
3 Improved analysis and asymptotic tightness
There are several directions for improvement of the obtained approximate solution
to the bundle pricing problem. First, instead of the constructed uniform price vectors
pk, k = 1, . . . , K , we can use price vectors maximizing the revenue in the Sk -restricted
problems, with given set of winners W = Sk . Notice that, for any set of winners
W ⊆ J , the price vector maximizing the revenue obtained from W can be found
in polynomial time by solving a simple linear program; see (Grigoriev et al. 2009;
Guruswami et al. 2005). Unfortunately, this approach does not necessarily lead to any
provable improvement of the performance guarantee.
The following approach allows us to slightly improve the performance guarantee;
it is simply based on a more careful analysis. By construction of the partition of J , for
any two subsets Sk and Sk′ , k ≤ k′, the average valuation of any customer from Sk is at
most the average valuation of a customer from Sk′ . Therefore, for any k = 1, . . . , K ,
and for all k′ ≥ k, if Sk ⊆ W , then Sk′ ⊆ W as well. By definition of the subsets, the
maximum average valuation in set Sk+1 is at most δ times the maximum average val-
uation in set Sk . Thus, we have that the revenue generated by price vector pk applied
to the set of customers J is at least
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Rk = 1
δ
Πk + 1
δ2
Πk+1 + · · · + 1
δK−k+1
ΠK , ∀k = 1, . . . , K .
These equalities can be equivalently represented by the following recurrent formu-
las
Rk = 1
δ
Πk + 1
δ
Rk+1, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1; (1)
RK = 1
δ
ΠK . (2)
Summing up all Eqs. (1) and (2) and dividing both sides by K , we derive
R¯ = 1
K
K∑
k=1
Rk = 1K δ
K∑
k=1
Πk + 1K δ
K∑
k=1
Rk − 1K δ R1.
Let R1 = φ R¯. Since ∑Kk=1 Πk ≥ Π , we derive
R¯ ≥ Π
K (δ − 1) + φ .
Taking the maximum revenue over all price vectors pk, k = 1, . . . , K , we obtain
max
k=1,...,K Rk ≥ max{R1, R¯} ≥ max
{
φΠ
K (δ − 1) + φ ,
Π
K (δ − 1) + φ
}
,
that is minimized with φ = 1, yielding
max
k=1,...,K Rk ≥
Π
δ
(
1 + ln αln δ
) − ln αln δ
.
Note that δ
(
1 + ln αln δ
) − ln αln δ < δ ln α + δ for any δ ≥ 1. Given ε > 0, let δ =
1 + ε/(ln α + 1). Then,
δ ln α + δ =
(
1 + ε
ln α + 1
)
ln α +
(
1 + ε
ln α + 1
)
= 1 + ln α + ε,
and we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For any ε > 0, the bundle pricing problem admits an (1 + ln α + ε)-
approximation algorithm with computation time O(nm), and this performance guar-
antee is asymptotically tight.
We are only left to show that the performance guarantee established in Theorem 3
is asymptotically tight. To see this, consider the following instance, which is an adap-
tation of Example 1 from Bouhtou et al. (2007). Assume, there are M types of items.
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Let q > 1 be a real number, and let type i ∈ {1, . . . , M} consists of qi − qi−1 dis-
tinct items. For simplicity of presentation let us not bother with the fact that the values
qi −qi−1 might be fractional; any rounding would do the job, but only overcomplicates
the exposition. Observe that the number of items is m = ∑Mi=1(qi −qi−1) = q M −1.
There are n = m customers, and every customer requests a single dedicated and exclu-
sive item. All customers requesting an item of type i ∈ {1, . . . , M} have valuation
vi = q2M−i for that item. Thus, b¯min = q M , b¯max = q2M−1, and α = q M−1.
In the optimal solution all items are priced at the valuations of the corresponding
customers, yielding a total revenue
∑M
i=1 q2M−i (qi − qi−1) = Mq2M−1(q − 1).
Now notice that the above described approximation algorithm always produces a
uniform price vector, i.e., the prices for all items are identical. In the given example,
the uniform pricing capturing the first j types of items generates the total revenue∑ j
i=1 q2M− j (qi − qi−1) = q2M − q2M− j , which is maximized with j = M . Hence,
the optimal uniform pricing generates revenue q2M − q M , which is an upper bound
for what the algorithm can achieve. By straightforward calculations, the performance
guarantee for this instance can be bounded from below by L B = M q−1q and, by The-
orem 3, it is bounded from above by U B = 1 + ε + (M − 1) ln q. Now, the tightness
of the bound in Theorem 3 follows from the fact that, for any x > 0, there exists a
choice for M and q such that the ratio U B/L B is at most 1 + x . Essentially, we let
M tend to infinity and q approaches 1 from above.
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